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FIRST.

LIMITATION OF. .ARM.Al\IENT.
It was recognized at the outset that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to provide at this Conference for the limitation of land
forces.
So far as the army of the United States is concerned, there was
no question presented. It has always been the policy of the
linited States to have the regular military establishment upon the
smallest possible basis. At the time of the Armistice there were
in the field and in training in the American Army upwards of
4,000,000 men. At once, upon the signing of the Armistice, denwbilization began and it was practically completed in the course
of the following year, and to-day our regular establ.ishn1ent numbers less than 160,000 men. The British Empire has also reduced
its land forces to a minimum. The situation on the Continent
was vividly depicted in an eloquent address by M. Briand, speaking for the Government of France, in which he stated his conclusions as follows :
" The thought of reducing the armaments, which was the noble
purpose of this conference, is not one from which we ·would
feel disinterested from the point of view of land armaments.
'Ye have shown that already. Immediately after the armistice
demobilization began, and demobilization began as rapidly and
as completely as possible. According to the military laws of
France there are to be three classes of men;· that is, three generations of young men under the flag. That law is still extant;
that la'v is still valid. It has not been abrogated yet, and the
Government has taken the responsibility to reduce to two years
the time spent under the flag, and instead of three classesthree generations of young men-we have only two that are
doing military service. It is therefore an immediate reduction
by one-third that has already taken place in the effectives-and
I am speaking of the normal effectives of the metropolis, leaving
aside troops needed for colonial occupation or the obligation imposed by the treaty in Rhineland or countries under plebescite.
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"\Ve did not think that endeavor \Vas sufficient, and in the future
"re have plans in order to further restrict the extent of our army.
In a few days it is certain that the proposals of the Government
\Vill be passed in the Chamber, and in order to further reduce
the military service by half. That is to say, there will be only
one class and a half actually serving. The metropolitan French
nrmy \vould be therefore reduced by half, but if anybody asks us
to go further, to consent to other reductions,. I should have to
ans,ver clearly and definitely that it would be impossible for us
to do it without exposing ourselves to a rnost serious danger.
"You might possibly come and tell us, 'This danger that you
are exposed to, \Ve s~e it, \Ve realize it, and we are going to share
it wHh you. We are going to offer you all means-put all means
at your clisposal in order to secure your safety.' Immediately,
if we heard those \vords, of course we would strike upon another
plan. "\Ve should be only too pleased to demonstrate the sincerity of our purpose. But we understand the difficulties and
the necessities of the statesmen of other countries. vVe understand the position of other peop1es who have also to face difficult and troublous situations. We are not selfish en?ugh to
ask other people to give a part of their sovereign national independence in order to turn it to our benefit and come to our help.
We do not expect it; but here I am appealing to your consciences. If France is to remain alone, facing the situation such
as I have described, an~ wlthout any exaggeration, you must
not deny her what she wants in order to insure her security.
You must let her do what she has to do, if need arise and if the
time comes."
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" If by direction given to ·the labors of the Conference it were
possible somewhere over there in Europe-if it were poss~ble
to say that the outcome of this Conference is indirect blame and
opprobriun1 cast upon France-if it was possible to point out
France as the only country in the world that is still imperialistic,
as the only country that opposes final disarmament, then, gentlemen, indeed this Oon~erence would have dealt us a severe blow ;
but I am quite sure that nothing is further from your minds and
from your intentions. If after listening to this argument, after
we_ighing the reasons 'vhich you have just heard, you consider
it then as valid, then, gentlemen, you will still be with us and
you will agree with me in saying that France can not possibly
do anything but what she has actually done."
Senator. Scllanzer described the Italian situation as follows:_
"It is far from my mind to· discuss what France considers
indispensable for her national safety. That safety is as dear to
us as it may be to them, and we are still morally by the side of
our allies of yesterday and our friends of to· ·day.

....
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" I wanted to say this. Only may I be allowed to express the
wish and the hope that ~the general limitation of land a r mame nt
may become a reality with :n the shortest possible Hpace of t ime.
Italy has fought the war for the highest aims which a country
can seek, but Italy is in her soul a peace-loving nation. I shall
not repeat \vhat I had the honor t o state at the first meeting of
t he Conference, but I should like to emphasize a gain th at I taly
is one of the surest factors of the world's. peace, that she has no
r~ason whatsoever of conflict with any other country, that she
is following and putting constantly into action a policy inspired
by the principle-of maintaining peace among all nations.
" Italy has succeeded in con1ing to a direct understanding
with the Serb, Croat, and Slovene people and in order to attain
s uch an end had made considerable sacrifices for the interest of
t he peace of Europe. Italy has pursued toward the successor
countries to her former enemies a policy not only of pacification,
but of assistance. And when a conflict arose between Austria
and Hungary, a conflict which might have dragged into war the
Danubian peoples, has offered to the two countries in conflict her
friendly help in order to settle the dispute. Italy has succeeded
and in so doing has actively contributed to the peace of Europe.
" :Moreover, Italy has acted similarly within her own frontiers
and has reduced her armed forces in the largest possible measure.
She has considerably curtailed her navy expenditures in comparison to the pre-war time. The total amount of her armed
forces does not exceed 200,000 men and a further reduction to
175,000 men is already planned, and 35,000 colored troops.
" Our ordinary war budget for the present financial year
amounts to $52,000,000, including $11,000,000 expenses for police
forces; the extraordinary part of the war budget, representing expenses dependent for the liquidation of the war, expenses
therefore of a purely transitory character, amounts to $62,000~000.
"However, although we have all reduced our armaments to the
greatest possible extent, we consider it necessary, for a complete
solution of the problem of limitation of armaments in Europe, to
take into consideration the armaments of the countries either
created or transformed as a result of the war. The problem is
not a simple one. It must be considered as a whole. It is a
serious and urgent problem, for which a solution at no far distant
day is necessary."
Baron I{ato spoke as follows:
" I would like to say this morning just a few words on land
armament limitation. Japan is quite ready to ap.nounce her
hearty approval of the pr:nciple which aims to relieve a people of
heavy burdens by limiting land armaments to those which are
necessary for national security and the maintenance of order
w ithin the territory.
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"The size of the land armaments of each state should be deternlined by its peculiar geographical situation and other circumstances, and these basic factors are so divergent and complicated that an effort to draw final comparisons is hardly possible. If I may venture to say it, it is not an easy task to lay
down a general scheme for the limitation of land armaments, as
in the case of limitation of naval armaments. Nevertheless,
Japan has not the slightest intention of maintaining land armaments which are in excess of those which are absolutely necessary for purely defensive purposes, necessitated by the Far Eastern situation."
Further consideration made it quite clear that no agreement for
the limitation of land forces could be had at this time.
LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT.

A different condition existed in relation to naval armament. It
was believed by the Government of the United States that an
agreement providing for a sweeping reduction and for an effective
limitation for the future was entirely feasible. It was pointed
out, after considering the failure of earlier endeavors for limitation of armaments that the Powers could no longer content themselves with investigations, with stati~tics, with reports, with the
circtunlocution of inquiry; that the tin1e had come, and the Conference had been ca'lled, not for general resolutions or mutual
advice, but fo'r action.
The fono·wing general considerations were deemed to be
perth1ent.
" The first is that the core of the difficulty is to be found in
the co1npetition in naval programs, and that, in order appropriately to limit naval armament, competition in its production
must be abandoned. Competition will not be remedied by resolves
with respect to the method of its continuance. One program
inevitably leads to another, and if competition continues its
regulation is impracticable. There is only one adequate way out
and that is to end it now.
"It is apparent that this can not be accomplished 'vithout
serious sacrifices. Enormous sums have been expended upon
ships under construction and building programs ·which are now
under way can not be given up without heavy loss. Yet if the
present construction of capital ships goes forward other ships
'vill inevitably be built to rival them, and this will lead to still
others. Thus the race will continue so long as ability to continue
lasts. The effort ,.to escape sacrifices is futile. We must face
them or yield our purpose.
"It is also clear that no one of the naval Powers should be
expected to make ~hese sacrifices alone. The only hope of limita-
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tion of naval armament is by agreement among the nations concerned, and this agreement should be entirely fair and reasonable
in the extent of the sacrifices required of each of the Powers.
In considering the basis of such an agreement, and the commensurate sacrifices to be required, it is necessary to have regard
to the existing naval strength of the great naval Pow~rs, including the extent of construction already effected in the case of
ships in process. This follows from the fact that one nation
is as free to compete as another, and each may find grounds for
its action. \Vhat one may do another may demand the opportunity to rival, and we remain in the thrall of competitive effor:t."
But it was necessary to go beyond general observations. It
was apparent that, in this field of opportunity, it was essential
that the American Government, as the convener of the Conference,
should be prepared with a definite and practicable plan. After
the most careful consideration and detailed examination of the
problem, with the aid of the experts of the American· Navy, a
_plan was prepai"€d and, under instructions of the President, was
presented to the Conference by the American Delegation.
(

THE AMERICAN

PLAN.

It was clear at the outset, and the negotiations during the Conference put it beyond doubt, that no agreement for the limitation of naval armament could be effected which did not embrace
the navies of France and Italy. At the same time, it was recognized that neither of these. nations, in view of the extraordinary
conditions due to the \Vorld War, affecting their existing naval
strength, could be expected to make the sacrifices which necessarily would lie at the basis of an agreement for limitation. These
sacrifices could, however, be reasonably -expected of the United
States, the British En1pire, and Japan, and these were the Powers
then actually engaged in the competitive building of warships.
The American plan, therefore, temporarily postponed the consideration of the navies of France and Italy and definitely proposed a program of limitation for the United States, British
Empire, and Japan. The proposal was one of renunciation of
building programs, of scrapping of existing ships, and of establishing an agreed ratio of naval strength. It was a proposal of
sacrifices, and the American Government, in making the proposal,
at once stated the sacrifices which it was ready to make and
upon the basis of which alone it asked commensurate sacrifices
from others.
The American plan rested upon the application of these fonr
general principles :
" (1) That all capital-shipbuilding programs, either actual or
.projected, should be abandoned;
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" ( 2) That further reduction should be made through the
scrapping of certain of the older ships;
" (3) That in general regard should be had to the existing
naval strength of the Powers concerned ;
" ( 4) That the capital ship tonnage should be used· as the
measure1nent of strength for navi~s and a proportionate allowance of auxiliary combatant craft prescribed."
l\lore specifically, the plan in relation to capital ships was as
follows:
" CAPITAL· SHIPS.

" United States:
"The Ul).ited States is now completing its progran1 of 1916
calling for 10 new battleships and 6 battle cruisers. One battleship has been completed. The others are in various stages of
construction ; in some cases from 60 to over 80 per cent of the
construction has been done. On these 15 capital ships now being
built over $330,000,000 have been spent. Still, the United States
is ·willing in the interest of an immediate limitation of naval
urmament to scrap all these ships.
"The United States proposes, if this plan is accepted" (1) To scrap all capital ships now under construction. This
includes 6 battle cruisers and 7 battleships on the ways and
in course of building, and 2 battleships launched.·
"The total number of new capital ships thus to be scrapped
is H?. The total tonnage of the new capital ships when completed would be 618,000 tons.
"(2) To scrap all of the older battleships up to, but not
including, the Delaware and N ort,h Da.Jcotn. The number of these
old battleships to be scrapped is 15. Their total tonnage iJ~
227,7 40 tons.
"Thus the number of capital ships to be scrapped by the
United States, if this .plan is accepted, is 30, with an aggregate
tonnage (including that of ships in construction, if completed)
of 845,740 tons.
" Great Bri.tain:
"The plan contemplates that Great Britain and Japan shall
take action which is fairly commensurate with this action on the
part of the United States.
"It is proposed that Great Britain" ( 1) Shall stop further construction of the four new Hoods,
the new capital ships not 'laid down but upon which money
has been spent. These 4 ships, i:(: completed, would have tonnage
displacement of 172,000 tons.
"(2) Shall, in addition, scrap her predreadnaughts, secondline battleships, and first-line battleships up to, but not including, the J(ing George V class.

JAPANESE NAVY.
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''These, with certain predreadnaughts which it is understood
have already been scrapped, would amount to 19 capital ships
and a tonnage reduction of 411,375 tons.
"The total tonnage of ships thus to be scrapped by Great
Britain (including the tonnage of the 4 Floods, if completed)
would be 583,375 tons.

"Japan:
"It is proposed that Japan"(1) Shall abandon her program of ships not yet laid down,
Yiz, the Jl.ii, Ou;ari, No. 7, and No. 8 battleships, and Nos. 5, 6,
7, and 8, battle cruisers.
"It should be observed that this does not involve the stopping
of construction, as the construction of none of these ships has
been begun.
"(2) Shall scrap 3 capital ships (the ].futsu launched, the
Tosa and Kago in course of building) and 4 battle cruisers
(the Anwgi and Akagi in course of building, and the A toga
and Takao not yet laid down, but for which certain material
has been assembled).
"The total number of new capital ships to be scrapped under
this paragraph is seven. The total tonnage of these new capital
ships when completed would be 289,100 tons.
" ( 3) Shall scrap all predrea'd naughts and battleships of the
second line. 'l'his would include the scrapping of all ships up
to but not including the Settsu_; 'that is, the scrapping of 10 older
ships, with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons.
" The total reduction of tonn~ge on vessels existing, laid down,
or for which material has been assen1bled (taking the tonnnage
of the new ships when completed), would be 448,928 tons.
"Thus under this plan there would be immediately destroyed,
of the navies of the three Powers, 66 capital fighting ships, built
and building, with a total tonnage of 1,878,043.
" It is proposed that it should be agreed by the United States,
Great Britain, and Japan that their navies, with respect to
capital ships, within three months after the making of the agreement, shall consist of certain ships designated in the proposal and
numuering for the United States 18, for Great Britain 22, for
Japan 10.
"The tonnage of these ships would be as follows: Of the United
States, 500,650; of Great Britain, 604,450; of Japan, 299,700. In
reaching this result, the age factor in the case of the respective
navies has received appropriate consideration.
"Replacement:
""\Vith respect to replacement, the United States proposes:
"(1) That it be agreed that the first replacement tonnage shall
uot be laid down until 10 years from the date of the agreement;
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"(2) That replacement be limited by an agreed maximum of
capital ship tonnage as follows:
Tons.
For the United States-------------:----------------- 500, 000
For Great Britain _________________________________ 500, 000
For Japan ________________________________________ 300,000

"(3) That subject to the 10-:year limitation above fixed and the
maximum standard, capital ships may be replaced when they are
20 years old by new capital ship construction;
" ( 4) That no capital ship shall be built in replacement with a
tonnage displacement of more than 35,000 tons."
This proposal was presented on behalf of the American Delega·
tion at the first session of the Conference, and at once evoked from
the other delegates expressions of assent in principle. The question of a definite agreement, however, presented many diffi~ultfes
requiring protracted negotiations, in which a conclusion was_ not
finally reached until January 31, 1922, when the draft of the proposed Naval Treaty was adopted in the Committee on Limitation
of Armament.
CAPITAL SHIP RATIO.

\

It was obvious that no agreement for limitation was possible if
the three Powers were not content to take as a basis their actual
existing naval strength. General considerations of national need,
aspirations and expectations, policy and program, could be
brought forward by each Power in justification of some hypothetical relation of naval strength with no result but profitless
and interminable discussion. The solution was to take 'vhat
the Powers actually had, as it was manifest that neither could
better its relative position unless it won in the race 'vhich it
was the object of the Conference to end. It was impossible to
terminate competition in naval armament if the Powers were to
condition their agreement upon the advantages they hoped to
gain in the competition itself. Accordingly, when the argument
was presented by Japan that a better ratio-that is, one more
favorable to .Japan than that assigned by the A1nerican planshould be adopted and emphasis was placed upon the asserted
needs of Japan, the answer was 1nade that if Japan was entitled
to a better ratio upon the basis of actual existing naval strength,
it should be, but otherwise it could not be, accepted. The American plan fixed the ratio between the United States, the British
Empire, and Japan as 5-5-3 or 10-10-6; Great Britain at once
agreed, but the Japanese Govern1nent desired a ratio of 10-10-7.
There ·was general agremnent .that the American rule for deterInining existing naval strength was correct; that . is, that it
should be determined according to capital ship tonnage. There
was, ho·wever, a further question and that was as to what should
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be embraced for that purpose within the capital ship tonnage of
each nation. It was the position of the American Government
that paper programs should not be counted, but only ships laid
down or upon which money had been spent. It was also the position of the American Government that ships in course of construction should be counted to the extent to which construction
had already progressed at the time of the convening of the Conference. The latter position was strongly contested by Japan
upon the ground that a ship 'vas not a ship unless it was completed and ready to fight. It was pointed out, however, that in
case of an emergency a warship which wa'S 90 per cent completed was to that extent ready and that only the remaining 10
per cent of construction was necessary; and, similarly, in the
case of a ship 70 per cent or 50 per cent or other per cent completed, the work done was so much of naval strength in hand.
It lvas also pointed out that it did not follow that because a ship
had been completed that it was ready for action ; it might be
out of repair; its engines, boilers, apparatus, armament, might
need replacement. It was idle to attempt to determine naval
strength on supposed readiness for action at a' given day. Objections could be n1ade to any standard of measurement, but the
most practicable standard was to take the existing capital ship
tonnage, including the percentage· of construction already effected
in the case of ships which were being built. It was added that
the American Government, while ready to sacrifice, in accordance
with the terms of its proposal, its battleships and battle cruisers
in course of construction, was not willing to ignore the percentage
of naval strength represented by over $300,000,000 expended on
the unfinished ships.
The American Government submitted to the British and Japanese naval experts its records with respect to the extent of the
work which had been done on the ships under construction, and
the negotiations resulted in an acceptance by both Great Britain
and .Japan of the ratio which the American Government had proposed.
FORTIFICATIONS IN THE PACIFIC.

-

Before assenting to this ratio the Japanese Government desired assurances with regard to the increase of fortifications and
naval bases in the Pacific Ocean. It was insisted that while the
capital ship ratio proposed by the American Government might
be acceptable under existing conditions, it could not be regarded
as acceptable by the Japanese Government if the Government of
the United States should fortify or -establish additional naval
bases jn the Pacific Ocean.
The American Government took the positlon that it could not
entertain any question as to the fortifications of its own coasts
25882-23--18
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or of the I-Ia·w aiian Islands, with respect to which it must remain
entirely unrestricted. Despite the fact that the American Government did not entertain any aggressive purpose whatever, it was
recognized that the fortification of other insular possessions in the
Pacific might be regarded fron1 the Japanese .$tandpoint as creating a new naval situation, and as consqtuting a menace to Japan,
and hence the American Delegation expressed itself as willing to- ,
maintain the status q1w as to fortifications and naval bases in its
insular possessions in the Pacific, except as above stated, if Japan
and· the British Empire would do the like. It ·was recognized that
no limitation should be made with respect to the main islands
of Japan or Australia and New Zealand, ·with their adjacent islands, any more than with respect to the insular possessions adjacent to the coast of the United States, including Alaska and the
Panan1a Canal Zone, or the Hawaiian Islands. Tl).e case of the
Aleutian Islands, stretching out toward Japan, was a special one
and had its counterpart in that of the I{urile Islands belonging
to Japan and reaching out to the northeast toward the Aleutians.
It was finally agreed that the S'tatttts q1to should be maintained as
to both these groups.
After prolonged negotiations, the three Powers-the United
States, the British Empire and Japan-made an agreement that
the statttts quo at the time of the signing of the Naval Treaty, with
regard to fortifications and naval bases, should be maintained in
their respective territories and possessions, which were specified
as follows (Naval Treaty, Article XIX) ;
""'
" ( 1) '.rhe insular possessions which the United States no\v
hc•lds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean, except (a)
those adjacent to the coast of the United States, Alaska, and the
Panama Canal Zone, not including the Aleutian Islands, and (b)
the Hawaiian Islands;
"(2) Hongkong and the ins~ular possessions \vhich the British
Empire now holds or may hereafter acquire in the Pacific Ocean
e~i st of the meridian of 110° east longitude, except (a) those adjacent to the coast of Canada, (b) the Commonwealth of Australia
and its Territories, and (c) New Zealand;
" ( 3) The following insular territories and possessions of Japan
in the Pacific Ocean, to wit: The Kurile Islands, the Bonin
Islands, Amami-Oshima, the Loochoo Islands, Formosa, and the
Pescadores, and any insular territories or possessions in the Pacific
Ocean which Japan may hereafter acquire."
The same article of the treaty also contains the following provision with respect to the meaning of the maintenance of the
status quo:
"The maintenance· of the status quo under the foregoing provisions implies that no new fortifications or naval bases shall
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he established in the territories and voss~ssions specified; that
no measures shall be taken to increase the existing naval faeilities for the revair and maintenance of naval forces, and that no
increase shall be made in the coast defences of the territo~·ies and
possessi~ns above specified. This restriction, however, does not
preclude such repair and replacement of worn-out weapons and
equipn1ent as is customary in naval and military establishments
in time of peace."
THE CASE OF THE " MUTSU."

Among the ships 'vhich the American Government proposed
should be scrapped by Japan was the 111utsu. It was the understanding of the American Government that this ship was still
incon1pJete af the time of the meeting of the Conference, although
it was nearly con1pleted; that is, to the extent of about 98 per
cent. It was proposed to be scrapped as all other ships which
'''ETe in course of construction ; thus the Government of the
l:nited States included anwng its own ships which were to be
scTfll1ped two ships wllich were about 90 per cent completed.
The Japanese Delegation, however, insisted that the 111utsn had
f!('tuall;y been finished, was commissioned and fully manned before
tbe Conference n1et. A11art fr01n this point, this latest accession
to the Japanese Navy 'vas the especial pride of the Japanese
reople. It was their finest war vessel and, it is understood, had
been built, in part at least, through popular subscriptions and in
circumstances evoking patriotic pride in the highest degree.
It was deemed by the .Japanese Delegation to be quite impossible to induce the consent of their Government to any proposal
of limitation which would involve the scrapping of the 111utsu.
Its retention, howe,'er, created serious difficulties because of the·
disproportion of advantage that would accrue to Ja11an through
the possession of such a ship. Japan offered to scra11 the Scttsn,
one of the older ships tlu~t was to have been retained by Japan
under ~the American plan, and also recognized that the ga ·n to
Japan through the Jllutsu should be offset by the completion on
the part of tlle United States of two of her battlesbi11s under construction and by the eonstruction on the part of Great Britain of
two new ships.
It was accordingly agreed that the Government of the United
States should finish two ships of the 1Vest Virrg!nia class that
were under construction, and on their completion should scrap
the Tort h Dakota and the Delaware, which under the original
plan were to ha,,e been retained. Great Britain on her part was
to be permitted to build two ne .v ships, and upon the ·r completion was to scrap four ( 4) of the older ships which would otherwise have been retained. In this way the balance of the three
navies was kept. Nor was there any serious change in the final
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agreement establishing the maximum limits of the capital ship
replacement tonnage. The original American plan had called
for the following :
United States, 500,000 tons.
British Empire, 500,000 tons.
Japan, 300,000 tons.
The plan as n1odifiecl became :
United States, 525,000 tons.
British Empire, 525,000 tons.
Japan, 315,000 tons.
Thus maintaining the ratio of 5-5-3.
An important concession was made by Great Britain with
respect to the t\vo new· ships which she was permitted to build.
Great Britain, as stated in the American proposal, had already
planned four ( 4) new IIoods. These ships had been designed
and considerable time would have been saved in proceeding to
build the two new ships according to the existing plans, but the
new ships were designed greatly to exceed in tonnage any existing
ship; their tonnage displacement, it is understood, was to be
about 49,000 tons. Great Britain agreed not only to abandon her
program for the four ( 4) new Hoods, but in building the two
new ships that they should not exceed 35,000 tons standard displacement, respectively.
Thus with respect to capital ships the United States, the British
Empire, and Japan were able to reach an agreement, but this was
tentative and depended upon a suitable agreement being reached
with France and Italy.
FRANCE AND ITALY.

The sche1ne of reduction accepted by the United States, Great
Britain, and Japan involved the scrapping of capital ships to the
extent of approxin1ately 40 per cent of the existing strength. It
was realized that no such reduction could be asked of either
France or Italy and that the case of their navies required special
consideration.
France had seven ( 7) dreaclna ughts with a tonnage of 164,500
tons, and three ( 3) predreadnaughts, making a total of about
221,000 tons. In the case of the United States, Gr.eat Britain, and
Japan it was provided that their predreadnaughts should be
scrapped without any provision for replacement, and there was
to be, in addition, a reduction of about 40 per cent of the naval
strength represented by dreadnaughts and superdreadnaughts.
Reducing in the same proportion as the United States has reduced,
France's tonnage of capital ships would be fixed at 102,000 tons,
or, if the predreadnaughts of France were taken into the calculation on her side although omitted on the side of the United States,
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the total tonnage of France's capital ships being taken at 221,000
tons, a reduction on the same basis would leave France with only
136,000 tons. This was deemed to be impracticable. It was
thought entirely fair, however, that France, in the replacement
schedule, should be allowed a maximum tonnage equivalent to
the existing tonnage of her seven (7) dreadnaughts with a slight
increase; that is, that the maximum l.imit of capital ships, for
the purpose of replacement, should be fixed at 175,000 tons.
Italy sought parity with France, and this principle having been
accepted in the course of the discussion, it was likewise proposed
that Italy should be allowed 175,000 tons of capital ships in replacement. The present tonnage of Italy is about 182,8QO tons.
The proposed maximu.m limit of 175,000 tons was at once accepted
by Italy.
France expressed the desire to be ' allowed 10 capital ships,
which, at a tonnage of 35,000 tons each, would have given her
350,000 tons. This was deemed to be excessive as a part of a plan
for the limitation of armament, and, had it been insisted upon,
would probably have made impossible an agreement for an effective
limitation of capital ship tonnage. But ,after discussion, France
consented to the maximum limit of 175,000 tons for capital ships.
AUXILIARY CRAFT. -

In the original Americ.an proposal it was stated that the
allowance of auxiliary combatant craft to each Power should be
in proportion to the capital ship tonnage. The proposal for the
three Powers-the United States, Great Brrtain, and Japan-was
that the total tonnage of cruisers, flotilla leaders, an<l destroyers
allo\ved each Power should be as follows:
United States, 450~000 tons.
Great Britain, 450,000 tons.
Japan, 270,000 tons.
- And that the total tonnage of submarines allowed -each of these
Po\\·ers should be :
United States, 90,000 tons.
Great Britain, 90,000 tons.
Japan, 54,000 tons.
In the same proportion as the capital ship tonnage, this would
have left for France and Italy, in the case of cruisers, flotilla
leaders and destroyers, a maximum of 150,000 tons for each of
these Powers; and, in the case of submarines, a maximum of
30,000 tons each.
I
The American Delegation felt that the original proposal for
submarines was too high, and, aided by the advice of our naval
experts, proposed that the maximum limit for the United States
and Great Britain in submarine tonnage should be 60,000 tons
each; and that France, Japan, and Italy should retain the tonnage
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in submarines that they now have; tl1at is, should maintain the
status quo as regards submarine tonnage. It was understood that
the present sub1narine tonnage of France was 31,391 tons; of
Japan 31,452 tons, and of Italy s(nnewhat less, about 21,000 tons.
'This proposition was not accepted, being opposed both by Japan
and France. Japan stated her willingness to adhere to the
original proposal, ·which allowed her 54,000 tons in submarines.
In accepting the allowance for capital ships, France had made
a distinct reservation. It was said that it would be impossible
for the French Government to accept reductions for light cruisers,
torpedo boats, and submarines corresponding to those which were
accepted for capital ships. Accordingly, France maintained that
her necessities required that she should b~ allowed 330,000 tons
for cruisers, etc., and 90,000 tons for submarines.
M. Sarraut thus stated the position of the French Government:
" After exa1nining, on the other hand, the composition of the
forces needed by France in auxiliary craft and submarines,
which are specially intended for the protection of her territory
and its communications, the Cabinet and the· Supreme Council
of National Defense have reached the conclusion that it is impossible to accept a limitation below that of 330,000 tons for
auxiliary craft and 90,000 tons for submarines, without imperiling the vital interests of the country and of its colonies and the
safety of their naval life.
"The French Delegation has been instructed to consent to no
concession on the above figures.
" To sum up, France accepts, as regards capital ships, the sacrifice which she must face in order to meet the views of the Conference and which represents an important reduction of her
normal sea power. She limits the program of the future establishment of her fleet to 330,000 tons for auxiliary craft and to 90,000
tons for submarines."
In view of the insistence on the part of the French Delegation
that they could not abate their requirements as to auxiliary craft
and submarines, the British Delegation stated that they were
unable to consent to a limitation of auxiliary craft adapted to
meet submarines.
For this reason it "\Vas found to be impossible to carry out the
American plan so far as limitation of auxiliary craft and submarines was concerned.
THE

NAV~U..

TREATY.

The agreement finally reached was set forth in the Naval
'.rreaty, signed on February 6, 1922.
With respect to capital ships, while there are certain changes in
detail, the integrity of the plan proposed on behalf of the American
Government has been maintained, and the spirit in which that

THE NAVAL TREATY.
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:proposal was made, and in which it was received, dominated the
entire negotiations and brought them to a successful conclusion.
The treaty is in three chapters:
(1) A chapter containing the general principles or provisions
relating to the limitation of naval armament.
(2) A chapter containing rules for the execution of the agreenlent.
( 3) A chapter containing certain miscellaneous provisions.
\Vithout following the order of this arrangement, the substance
<Of the treaty may be thus stated:
The first subject with ·which the treaty deals is that of the limitations as to capital ships, which are defined as follows:
"A capital ship, in the case of ships hereafter built, is defined
as a Yessel of wa-r, not an aircraft carrier, whose displacement
exceeds 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement
or \Vhich carries a gun with a caliber exceeding 8 inches (203
n1illimeters) ." ( Oh. II, Pt. 4.)
.The treaty specifies the capital ships which each of the five
Powers may retain. Thus, the United States of America is to
Tetain 18 capital ships, with a tonnage of 500,650, tons; the British
Empire 22 capital ships, with a tonnage of 580,450 tons; France
10 ships, of 221,170 tons; Italy 10 ship~ of 182,800 tons; Japan 10
ships, of 301,320 tons. ( Oh. II, Pt. 1.)
In reaching this result, the age factor in the case of the respective naYies has received consideration.
The treaty provides that all other capital ships of these Powers,
either built or building, are to be scrapped or disposed of as pro-vided in the treaty. (Art. II.)
It is provided that the present building programs are to be
abandoned and that there is to be no building of capital ships
hereafter except in replacement and as the treaty provides.
(Art. III.)
It may be useful to make a comparison of this result with the
proposal which was made at the beginning of the Conference on .
behalf of the American Delegation. That proposal set forth that
18 ships were to be retained by the United States with a tonnage
of 500,650 tons. In this treaty the same ships are to be retained.
In that proposal there were set forth 22 capital ships to be
retained by the British Empire. - Under the treaty the same
number of ships is to be retained, in fact, the same ships, with
the single exception of the substitution of the Thunderer for the
Erin, with a total tonnage of 580,450, as against the calculation
in the original proposal of 604,450 tons for ships retained.
In the case of .Japan, the proposal set forth 10 ships to be retained. By the treaty, the same number of ships is to be retained, the difference being that the llfutstt is to be retained and
the Settsu (which was to have been retained) is to be scrapped.
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The tonnage retained by Japan, as calculated in the original
proposal, was 299,700 tons. The tonnage retained under the
treaty is 301,320.
The effect of the retention of the ]Jutsu by Japan was to make
necessary certain changes to which reference has already been
made, and for which the treaty provides. These changes are:
In the case of the United States, it is provided that two ships
of the West Virginia class, now under construction, may be completed, and that on their completion two of the ships which were
to have been retained, the North Dakota, and the Delaware, are
to be scrapped.
In the case of the British E1npire, two new ships may be built,
not exceeding 35,000 tons each ; and on completion of these two
ships, "four ships, the Thunderer, J(ing George V, the Ajax, an<l
the Centurion, are to be scrapped.
In the case of Japan, as has been said, the difference is that the
ll1utsu is retained and the Settsu scrapped.
Aside from these changes, the principles set forth in the American proposal in relation to capital ships have been appl!ed, and
the capital ship program is in its essence carried out.
A further comparison may be made with respect to ships to
be scrapped.
In the case of the United States, it was proposed to scrap all
capital ships now under construction, that is to say 15 ships, in
various stages of construction. Instead, 13 of these ships are to
be scrapped or disposed of. The total number of capital ships
which were to be scrapped by the United States, or disposed of,
was stated to be 30. Under the treaty, the number is 28, with a
very slight difference in total tonnage.
In the case of Great Britain, the construction of the 4 great
Hoods has been abandoned, and \Vhile Great Britain is to have 2
new ships, limited to 35,000 ·tons each, 4 of the retained ships are
to be scrapped, as already stated, 'vllen these 2 ships are completed.
It was also provided in the original proposal that Great Britain
should scrap her predreadnaughts, second line battleships and
first line battleships, up to and not including the J(ing George V.
These ships, with certain predreadnaughts which it was· understood had already been scrapped, would amount to 19 capital
ships, with a tonnage reduction on this account of 411,375 tons.
This provision is substantially unaffected by the treaty, the fact
being that under the treaty 20 ships are to be scrapped instead
of 19 that were mentioned in th~ proposal.
In the case of Japan, the proposal was that Japan" ( 1) Shall abandon her program of ships not yet laid down,
viz, the J(ii, Owari, No. 7 and No. 8, battleships, and Nos. 5, 6, 7,
and 8, battle cruisers."

SCRAPPING.
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This proposal has been carried out and the program has been
abandoned by Japan.
"(2) Shall scrap 3 capital ships (the JJ1utsu, launched ; the
Tosa and J(ago, in course of building) and 4 battle cruisers (the
Antagi and Akagi in course of building, and the Atoga and
Takao not yet laid down, but for which certain material bas been
assembled). The total number of new capital ships to be
scrapped under this program is 7. The total tonnage of these
capital ships when completed would be 289,100 tons."
·Under the treaty Japan is to scrap all the ships mentioned with
the exception of the JJ1utsu.
"(3) Shall scrap all predreadnaughts and battleships of the
second line. This would include the scrapping of all ships up
to but not including the Settsu J. that is, the scrapping of 10 older
ships with a total tonnage of 159,828 tons."
Under the treaty 10 ships are scrapped, including the Settsu instead of excluding it.
The~·e are certain special provisions with regard to capital
ships ·which should be mentioned in order that there may be no
misapprehension, although the matter itself is ' insignificant. In
the tables in Section II of Chapter II, Part 3, it is provided that
the United States may retain the 01·egon and Illinois for noncombatant purposes after they have been emasculated in accordance
with certain provisions of the treaty. There is a sentimental
reason for the retention of the Oregon, which it is understood
the State of Oregon desires to possess.
The British Empire is permitted to retain the Colossus and the
Collingswood for noncombatant purposes after they have been
emasculated. These have already been withdrawn from combatant use.
There is also a provision in the case of Japan that 2 of her
older ships, over 20 years old, the Shikashirna and the Asahi,
'vhich were to be scrapped, may be retained for noncombatant
purposes after they have been emasculated, as stated.
The matter of scrapping is not left to conjecture or to the decision of each of the Powers taken separately, but is carefully
defined by the treaty in Part 2 of Chapter II, as follows:
" RULES FOR SCRAPPING VESSELS OF WAR.

" I. A vessel to be scrapped must be placed in such a condition that can not be put to comb~tant use.
"II. This result must be finally effected in any one of the
following ways :
" (a) Permanent sinking of the vessel;
"(b) Breaking the vessel up. This shall always involve the
destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers, and armor, and
all deck, side, and bottom plating;
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'' (c) Converting the vessel to target use, exclusively * * *
Not more than one capital ship may be retained for this purpose
at one tin1e by any of the Contracting Powers."
There is a special provision in the case of France and Italy
that they may severally retain two seagoing vessels for training
purposes exclusively; that is, as gunnery or torpedo schools.
The treaty describes the vessels, or the chiss to which they belong, and France and Italy undertake to remove and destroy
their conning towers and not to use them as vessels of war.
· There is also provision as to the two stages of scrapping The
first stage is intended to render the ship incapable of furiher
-vvarlike service and is to be immediately undertaken. The_ process
is set forth in great detail in respect to removal of guns or
machinery for ·working hydraulic or electric mountings, or firecontrol instrun1ents and range finders, or ammunition, explosives,
and mines, or torpedoes, war-heads and torpedo tubes, or \vireless telegraphy installations, the conning tower and all side
armor, etc. ( Ch. II, Pt. 2, Sec. III, Subdivision A.)
In the. case of vessels that are to be immediately scrapped, the
v.rork of rendering them incapable of further warlike service is to
be completed within six months from the time of the coming into
force of the treaty and the scrapping is to be finally effected within
18 months from that time. In the case of vessels which are to be
s~rapped after the completion of the new ships which may be built
by the United States and the British Empire, respectively, the
work of rendering the vessel incapable of further warlike service
is to be commenced not later than the date of the completion of
its successor and is to -be finished within six months from that
time. The vessel is to be finally scrapped within 18 months from
that date.
The treaty provides the maximum replacement limits as follows:
United States________________________________ 5:!5, 000 tons.
British Empire _______________________________ 525, 000 tons.
France-----------------~-------------------- 175,000 tons.
ItalY---------------------------------------- 175,000 ton&
Japan __________ ._____________________________ 315, 000 tons:.

The size of each of the capital ships is limited to 35,000 tons; it
is also provided that no capital ship shall carry a gun of a calibre
in excess of 16 inches. The provisions for replacements of capital
.ships are set forth in charts, which form Section II of Part 3 of
Chapter II of the treaty.
In the case of the United States, the British Empire and Japan,
aside from the two ships that may be completed by the United
States and the two which may be built by the British Empire, the
first replacement is to begin ·with the laying down of ships in the
year 1931, for completion in 1934, and replacement takes place
-thereafter according to the age of the ships.

ATHCHAl!,'l' CARRIERS.

In the case of France and Italy, the first replacement is pernlitted for laying down in 1927 for completion in 1930 in the case
of France and in 1931 in the case of Italy.
The treaty also deals with aircraft carriers.
"An aircraft carrier is defined as a vessel of war with a displacement in excess of 10,000 tons "( 10,160 metric tons) standard
displacement desi~ned for the specific and exclusive purpose of
carrying aircraft. Jt must be so constructed that aircraft can
be launched therefrom and landed thereon, and not designed and
cdnstructed for carrying a more powerful armament than that
allowed to it under Article IX or Article X as the case may be."
( Ch. II, Pt. ·1.)
The total tonnage allowed for aircraft carriers is limited as
follows : (Art. VII.)
For the United States ________________________ _ 135, 000 tons.
British Empire ______________________________ _ 135, 000 tons.
France _____________________________________ _ 60,000 tons.
60, 000 tons.
ItalY---------------------------------------Japan ______________________________________ _
81,000 tons.

In v:ew of the experimental nature of the existence of aircraft
carriers, that fact is recognized and there is provision for replacement without regard to age. (Art. VIII.)
The maximum limit of each aircraft carrier is 27,000 tons.
,..rhere is, ho·wever, a special exception which permits Contracting
Powers to build not more than two aircraft carriers, each of a
tonnage of not more than 33,000 tons.
\Vhat has been said with regard to the disposition of existing
capital ships and their scrapp~ng is to be qualified by the statement that in order to effect economy any of the Contracting,
Powers may use, for the purpose of constructing aircraft carriers
as defined, any two of their ships, whether constructed or in
course of construction, which ·would otherwise be scrapped under
the treaty, and these may be of a tonnage of not more than
.33,000 tons. (Art. IX. )
The general provision as to the armament of aircraft carriers
is that if it has guns exceeding six inches, the total number of
guns shall not exceed 10. It can not carry a gun in excess of 8
inches. It may carry ·without lin1it 5-inch guns and antiaircraft
guns. (Art. X. )
In the case of a ~rcraft carriers of 33,000 tons, the total number
of guns to be carried, in case any of such guns are of caliber
exceeding 6 inches, except antiaircraft guns and guns not exceeding five inches, can not number more than 8. (Art. IX.)
\Vith respect to auxiliary craft, ~the treaty provides that no
vessel of war exceeding 10,000 tons, other than capital ships or
a:rcraft carriers, shall be acquired by or constructed by, for, or
'vithin the jurisdiction of any of the Contracting Powers. Ves-
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sels not specially built as fighting ships nor taken in time of
peace under Government control for fighting purposes which are
employed on fleet duties, or as troop transports, or in some other
way for the purpose of assisting in the prosecution of hostilities
othenvise than as fighting ships, are not ·within this limitation.
(Art. XI.)
The treaty_ contains certain provisions of a protective nature;
that is, for the purpose of securing the faithful execution of the
agreement.
Thus it is provided that no vessel of war of any of the Contracting Powers hereafter laid d9wn, except a capital ship, shall
carry a gun in excess of 8 inches (Art. XII) ; that no ship designated in the treaty to be scrapped may be reconverted into a
vessel of war (Art. XIII) ; that no preparations shall be made
in merchant ships in time of peace for the installation of 'varlike armament for the purpose of converting such ships into
vessels of war, other than the necessary stiffening of the decks
for the mounting of guns not exceeding 6 inches. (Art. XIV.)
There are also provisions with respect to the building of vessels
for foreign po·wers. Thus, no vessel of war constructed within the
jurisdiction of any of the Contracting Powers, for a noncontracting power, shall exceed the limits as to displacement and armament prescribed by the treaty for vessels of a similar type, constructed by or for any of the Contracting Powers; provided, however, that the displacement for aircraft carriers constructed for a
noncontracting power shall not exceed 27,000 tons. (Art. XV.)
It is provided that a Contracting Power, within the jurisdiction of which a vessel of war is constructed for a noncontracting
power, shall give suitab~ information to the other Contracting
Powers. (Art. XVI.)
Further, in the event of a Contracting Power being engaged in
war, such Power is not to use as a vessel of war any vessel of ·war
which 1nany be under construction within its jurisdiction for any
other power or which may have been constructed within its jurisdiction for another po·wer and not delivered. (Art. XVII.)
Each of the Contracting Po·wers undertakes not to dispose, by
gift, sale, or any mode of transfer, of any vessel of war in such a
manner that such vessel may become a vessel of war in the navy
of any foreign power (Art. XVIII). It is recorded in the proceedings of the Conference that this undertaking is regarded as
binding as a matter of honor upon the Powers from the date of
t he signing of the treaty.
Reference has already been made to the provision relating to
the maintenance of the status quo as to forti~cations and naval
bases in the Pacific Ocean.
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If, during the term of the treaty, which is 15 yoors, the require·
ments of the national security of any of the Contracting Powers,
in respect of naval defence are, in the opinion of that Power,
materially affected by any change of circumstances, the Contracting Powers agree, at the request of such Power, to meet in
conference with a view to the reconsideration of the provisions
of the treaty and · its amendment; by mutual agreement. (Art.
XXI.)
It is further provided that in view of possible technical and
scientific developments the United States, after consultation with
the other Contracting Powers, shall arrange for a Conference of
all the Contracting Povvers, which shall convene as soon as possible
after the expiration of 8 years from the coming into foree of
the treaty, to consider what changes; if any, may be necessary
to meet such developments. (Art. XXI.)
There is a special provision as to the effect of an outbreak of
war. The mere fact that one of the Contracting Powers becomes
engaged in war do~s not affect the obligations of the treaty. But
if a Contracting Power becomes engaged in a ~ar which, in its
opinion, affects the naval defence of its national security, such
Power may, after notice to the other Contracting Powers, suspend for the period of hostilities its obligations under the present
treaty, other than certain specified obligations, provided that such
Po·wer shall notify the other Contracting Powers that the emergency is of such a character as to require such suspension. In
such a case the remaining Contracting Powers agree to consult
together and ascertain what temporary modifications may be
required. If such consultation does not produce an agreement,
duly made in accordance with the constitutional methods of the
respective Power;;, any one of the Contracting Powers may, by
giving notice to the other Contracting Powers, suspend for the
period of hosti1itie~ its obligations under the present treaty, except as specified. On the cessation of hostilities the Contracting
Powers agree to meet in Conference to consider what modifications,
if any, should be made in the provisions of the treaty. (Art.
XXII.)
The treaty is to remain in force until December 31, 1936, and in
case none of the Contracting Powers shall have given notice two
years before that date of its intention to terminate the treaty, it is
to continue in force until the expiration of two years from the date
on which notice of termination shall be given by one of the Contracting Powers; whereupon the treaty shall terminate as regards
all the Contracting Powers. (Art. XXIII.)
'rhis is a summary of the engagements of the Naval Treaty.
Prohahly no more significant treaty was ever made. Instead of
discussing the desirability of diminishing the burdens of naval
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armament, the Conference has succeeded in limiting them to an
important degree.
It is obvious that this agreement means ultimately an enormous
saving of. money and the lifting of a heavy and unnecessary
burden. The treaty absolutely stops the race in competition in
naval arn1ament. At the san1e tilne it leaves the relative security
of the great naval po·wers unimpaired. No national interest has
been sacrificed; a "\vastefu~ production of unnecessary armament
has been ended.
vVhile it was desired that an agreement should be reached for
the limitation of auxiliary craft and submarines, its importance
should not be overestin1ated. Limitation has been effected where
it was most needed, both ·with respect to the avoidance of the
heaviest outlays and with reference to the promptings to war,
"\vhich may be found in excessive preparation. Moreover, it is far
from probable that the absence of limitation, in the other field,
will lead to production of either auxiliary craft or submarines in
excess of their normal relation to capital ships. Peoples are not
in a mood for unnecessary naval expenditures.
The limitation of capital ships, in itself, substantially meets the
existing need, and its indirect effect will be to stop the inordinate
production of any sort of naval craft.
RULES FOR CONTROL OF NE"\V AGENCIES OF

"\V~RFARE.

SUB.MARINES.

The British Delegation submitted a proposition for the abolition
of submarines. This proposal was put upon the records in the
following form :
"The British Empire Delegation desired fonnally to place on
record this opinion that the use of submarines, whilst of small
value for defensive purposes, leads inevitably to acts which are
inconsistent "\Vith the laws of war and the dictates of humanity,
and the delegation desires that united action should be taken by
all nations to forbid their maintenance, construction, or employ·
ment."
The proposal was discussed at length, the British Delegation
bringing forward in its support arguments of great force based
upon the experience of Great Britain in the recent war. It met
·w ith opposition from France, Italy, and Japan.
The American Delegation not only had the opinion of their
naval advisers in opposition to the proposal, but also had received
a careful report upon the subje~t from the Advisory Committee o.f
Twenty-One appointed by the President. This report was presented by the American Delegation as setting forth in a succinct
manner the position of their Government. In this report it was
stated:
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"Unlimited submarine warfare should be outlawed. Laws
should be drawn up prescribing the methods of procedure of submarines against merchant vessels both neutral and belligerent.
These rules should accord with the rules observed by surface
craft. Laws should also be made which prohibit the use of false
flags and offensive arming of merchant vessels. The use of false
flags has already ceased in land warfare. No one can prevent
an enen1;)· from running 'an1uck,' but immediately be does he
outlaws himself and invites sure defeat by bringing down the
wrath of the world upon his head. If the submarine is required
to operate under the san1e rule as combatant surface vessels no
objection can be raised as to its use against merchant vessels.
The individual captains of submarines are no more likely to violate
instructions from their government upon this point than are
captains of any other type of ship acting independently.
" SUBMARINES AGAINST COl\IBAT'ANT SHIPS.

" Against enemy men of war the submarine may be likened
to the advance guard on land which hides in a tree or uses
underbrush to conceal itself. If the infantry
its advance encounters an ambuscade, it suffers greatly even if it is not totally
annihilated. However, an ambuscade is entirely legitin1ate. In
the same fashion a submarine strikes the advancing enemy fr01n
concealn1ent and no nation crles out against this forn1 of attack
as illegal. Its Navy simply becomes more vigilant, moves faster
and uses its surface scouts to protect itself.
" The subn1arine carries the same weapons as surface vessels,
i. e., torpedoes, mines, and guns. There is no prohibition of
their use on. surface craft and there can be none on submarines.
Submarines are particularly well adapted to use mines and torpedoes. They can approach to the desired spot without being
seen, lay their 1nines or discharge their torpedoes, and n1ake th~ir
escape.
" The best defense against the1n is eternal vigilance and high
speed. This causes added fatigue to the personnel and greater
wear to the machinery. The continued n1enace of submarines in
the vicinity m~y so wear down a fleet that when it n1eets the
enemy it will be so exhausted as to mal{e its defeat a simple
matter.
"The submarine as a man-of-war has a very vital part to play.
It has come to stay. It may strike without warning against combatant vessels, as surface ships may do also, but 1nust be required to obserYe the prescribed rules of surface craft when O:Dposing merchantmen, as at other times.

in

(t

'l'HE Sl'"B:\IARINE AS A SCOUT.

"As a scout the submarine has great possibilities-it is the one
t~·pe of vessel able to proceed unsupported into distant enemy
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waters and maintain itself to observe and report enemy movements. At present its principal handicaps are poor habitability
and lack of radio po·wer to transmit its information. However,
these may be overcome in some degree in the future. Here, again,
the submarine has come to stay-it has great value, a legitimate
use, and no nation can decry its e1nployment in this fashion.

*

*

*

*

"The submarine is particularly an instrument of weak naval
powers. The business of the world is carried on upon the surface of the sea. Any navy which is dominant on the surface prefers to rely on that superiority; while navies comparatively
weak may but threaten that dominance by developing a nevv
form of attack to attain success through surprise. Hence submarines have offered and secured advantages until the method
of successful counterattack has been developed.
" The United States Navy lacks a proper number of cruisers~
The few we have would be unable to cover the necessary area to
obtain information. Submarines could greatly assist them as
they can. not be driven in by enemy scouts.
" The cost per annum of maintaining 100,000 tons of submarines fully manned and ready is about thirty million, dollars.
For the work which will be required of them in an emergency,
this cost is small when taken in connection with the entire Navy.
The retention of a large submarine force may at some future
time result in the United States holding its outlying. possessions.
If these colonies once fall the expenditure of men necessary to
recapture them will be tremendous and may result in a drawn
war which would really be a United States defeat. The United
States needs a large submarine force to protect its interests.
"The Committee is therefore of the opinion that unlimited
Yvarfare by submarines on commerce should be outlawed. The
right of visit and search must be exercised b·y submarines under
the same rules as for surface vessels. It does not approve limitation in size of submarines."
Illegal Submarine Warfare-Use of Subrna(rines Against Merchant
Ships-Poison Gas.

While the Conference was unable either to abolish or to limit
submarines, it stated, with clarity and force, the existing rules
of international law vvhich condemned the abhorrent practices
followed in the recent war in the use of submarines against
merchant vessels. The resolutions adopted by the Conference
as to the use of submarines against merchant vessels, and with
respect to the USe of pojson gas, \Vere put in the form Of a treaty
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which was signed on February 6, 1822.
of this treaty are as fo11o-vvs :
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The substantive portions

"I.
I

· " The Signatory Powers declare that among the rules adoptecl
by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and
noncombatants at sea in time of war, the following are to be
tleemed nn established vart of international law:
"(1) A merchant vessel must be or<J.2red to submit to visit
ai1d search to determine its character before it can be seized.
"A n1erchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to
submit to visit and search after warning, or to proceed as directed
after seizure.
"A merchant ve.ssel must not be destroyed unless the crew
and passengers have been first placed in safety.
" ( 2) Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances
exempt from the universal rules above stated; and if a sub1narine
can not capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules
the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack ·and
from seizure and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed un·molested.
\

" II.

The Signatory Powers invite all other civilized Po,\-ers to
express their assent to the foregoing statement of established
law so that there 1nay be a clear public understanding throughout
the world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion
of the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents.
H

"IlL

" The Signatory Powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of
the humane rules of existing law declared by them with respect
to attacks upon and the seizure and destruction of merchant
ships, further declare that any person in the service of any
Power \Vho shal(. .violate any of these rules, whether or not such
person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be
deemed to have violated the laws of war and shall be liable to
trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy and may be
brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any
Power within the jurisdiction of which he n1ay be found.
"IV.

'.' The Signatory Powers recognize the practical impossibility
..of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating,
2 5882-2 3--1!)
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as they were violated in the recent 'var of 1914-1918, the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the
protection of the lives of neutrals and nonco1nbatants, and to
the end that the prohibition of the use of submarines as con1n1e1~ce destroyers shall be universally accepted as a part of the
law of nations they now accept that prohibition as henceforth
binding as bet\vee.n themselves and they invite all other nations
to -adhere thereto.

"v.
"The use in ·war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases,
and all analogous liquids, materials or devices, having been justly
condemned by the general opinion of the civilized 'vorld and a
prohibition of such use having been declared "in treaties, to which
a majority of the civilized Powers are parties.
" The Signatory Po·wers, to the end that this prohibition shall
be universally accepted as a part of international law binding
alike the conscience and practice of nations, declare their assent
to such prohibition, agree to be bound thereby as between themselves, and invite all other civilized nations to adhere thereto.",
Mr. Root, in presenting this treaty for the approval of the
Conference, said :
"You 'vill observe that this treaty does not undertake to
codify international law in respect of visit, search, or seizure of
merchant vessels. What it does undertake to do is to state the
most important and effective provisions of the law of nations
in regard to the treatment of merchant vessels by belligerent
warships, and to declare that submarines are, under no circumstances, exempt from these humane rules for the protection of
the life of innocent noncombatants.
"It undertakes further to stigmatize violation of these rules,
and the doing to death of women and children and noncombatants by the wanton destruction of merchant vessels upon
which they are passengers and by a violation of the la\vs of war,
which as between these five great powers and all other civilized
nations who shall give their adherence shall be henceforth punished as an act of piracy.
"It undertakes further to prevent temptation to the violation
of these rules by the use of submarines for the capture of merchant vessels .and to prohibit that use altogether. It undertakes further to denounce the use of poisonous gases and chemicals in war, as they were used to the horror cf all civilization in
the war of 1914-1918.
" Cynics ha v.e said that in the· st~·ess of war these rules will be
violated. Cynics are always near-sighted, and often and usually
the dec~sive facts lie beyond the range of their vision.

CO::'IOUISSION ON RULES O:F' 'VAR.

".'Ye may grant tlwt rules limiting t11e use of implements of
\\·arfare macle between cliplomatists will be violated in the stress
of conflict. "re may grant that the most solemn obligation
assumed by governments in_ respect of the use of implements of
war will be violated jn the stress of conflict; but beyond diplomatists ancl beyond governments there rests the public opinion
of the civilized world, ancl the public opinion of the world. can
punish. It can bring its sanction to the support of a proh~bition
with as terrible consequences as any criminal statute of Congress
or of Parlian1ent.
""""e may grant that in n1atters which are complicated and
difficult, where t~1e facts are disputed and the argun1ent is
sophistic, public opinion n1ay be confused and ineffective, yet
when a rule of action, clear and simple, is based upon the fundamental icleas of lYpmanity and right conduct, and the public
opinion of the world has reached a decisive judgment upon it,
that rule will be enforced by the greatest po,ver known to human
history, the power that is the hope of the world, will be a hope
justified."
I

CO~D.IISSIO~

TO REVISE RULES OF WAR.

The Conference adopted the following resolution for the appointment of a commission to examine the rules made necessary
by recent experience 'vith respect to new agencies of warfare:
"I. That a commission composed of not more than two men1bers representing each of the above-mentioned Powers
shall be constituted to consider the following questions:
" (a) Do existing rules of International Law adequately
cover new methods of attack or defense resulting from the introduction or clevelopment since
the Hague Conference of 1907 of new agencies
of warfare?
"(b) If not so, what changes in the existing rules ought
to be adopted in con~equence thereof as a part
of the law of nations?
" II. That notices of appointment of the members of the commiss~on shall be transmitted to the Government of the
United States of America within three months after the
adjournment of the present Conference, which, after
consultation with the Powers concerned, will fix the day
and place for the meeting of the commission.
"III. That the commission shall be at liberty to request assistance and adv;ce _frmn experts in International Law and
in land, naval, and aerial warfare.
"IV. That the commission shall report its conclusions to each
pf the Powers represented in its membership.
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AIRCHAFT .

. " Th o s~ Powers shall thereupon confer as to the acceptance of
the report and tl:e cour:::;e to be follo·wed to secure the consideration of its recomn1endations by the other civilized Po·wers."
A further resolution was adopted at the sa1ne time, as foll0"\\1s:
"Resolved, That it is not the intention of the Powers agreeing
tt) the appointment of a Commission t_o consider and report upon
the rules of International Law respecting new agencies of warfare that the Commission shall review or report upon the rules
or declarations relating to submarines or the use of noxious
gases and chemicals already adopted by the Powers in this
Conference."
AIRCRAFT.

It was found to be in1practicable to adopt rules for the limitation of aircraft in number, size, or character, in vie'v of the fact
that such rules ·would be of little or no value unless the production of commercial aircraft were similarl;y restricted. It was
deemed to be inadvisable thus to hamper the development of a
facility which could not fail to be important in the progress of
civilization.

